India stands at a pivotal moment in its demographic journey. With a population of approximately 1.45 billion as of 2024, it is the world’s most populous nation, having surpassed China in 2023. For decades, India’s large and youthful population has been hailed as a potential "demographic dividend"—a window of opportunity where a high proportion of working-age individuals could drive economic growth. Yet, recent trends suggest this advantage may be slipping away, raising the question: Will India’s demography prove to be a dividend or a disaster? To answer this, we must examine India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR), its implications for the future, and how it compares to China’s demographic trajectory.
India’s TFR and the Replacement Level
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) represents the average number of children a woman is expected to have in her lifetime. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the "replacement level"—the point at which a population sustains itself without growing or shrinking, assuming stable mortality and no net migration. According to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019-21), India’s TFR has fallen to 2.0, dipping below the replacement level for the first time. This marks a significant decline from 3.4 in 1992-93 and 2.2 in 2015-16, reflecting the success of decades-long family planning initiatives, rising education levels, and urbanization.
However, this national average masks regional disparities. Southern states like Kerala (TFR 1.8) and Tamil Nadu (TFR 1.4) have long been below replacement level, while northern states like Bihar (TFR 3.0) and Uttar Pradesh (TFR 2.3) remain above it. Urban areas report a TFR of 1.6, compared to 2.1 in rural regions. A 2024 study in The Lancet projects India’s TFR to drop further—to 1.29 by 2050 and 1.04 by 2100—signaling a future of population decline.
What does this mean? A TFR below 2.1 indicates that, over time, each generation will produce fewer children than needed to replace itself. India’s population is still growing due to "demographic momentum"—a large cohort of young people entering reproductive age—but this growth will peak around 2048 at 1.6 billion, then decline to 1.1 billion by 2100, per The Lancet. This shift could either unlock economic potential or strain resources, depending on how India prepares.
The Dividend Dream
A demographic dividend occurs when the working-age population (15-64) outnumbers dependents (children under 15 and elderly over 65), boosting productivity and savings. India entered this phase in 2018, with 62.5% of its population in the working-age bracket, a figure expected to peak at 57% by the mid-2030s. The United Nations estimates this window will last until 2055, offering a 37-year opportunity to capitalize on a youthful workforce.
The potential is immense. By 2030, one in five working-age individuals globally could be Indian, according to government projections. To sustain economic growth, India must create 7.85 million jobs annually until 2030. If successful, this could propel India from a low-middle-income economy to a high-income one, mirroring the success of East Asian "tiger" economies like South Korea and Japan, which leveraged their demographic dividends decades ago.
The Disaster Risk
Yet, the dividend is not guaranteed. A shrinking TFR and an aging population pose significant risks. By 2050, 20% of India’s population—over 300 million people—will be over 60, outnumbering children in some regions. This rapid aging, driven by a TFR below replacement and rising life expectancy (from 41.7 years in 1950 to 70.1 in 2020), echoes challenges faced by developed nations. Unlike France or Sweden, which aged over 80-120 years, India will double its elderly population from 7% to 14% in just 28 years, leaving little time to build robust social security and healthcare systems.
Job creation remains a bottleneck. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (2022-23) shows a labor force participation rate of 53% for the 15-59 age group, meaning nearly half of India’s working-age population is jobless. Youth unemployment is stark, with 82.9% of the unemployed being under 35, per Fortune India. The informal economy dominates, offering low wages and no social security, while female participation lags at 37%, squandering half the potential workforce. Without massive investments in education, skills, and infrastructure, India risks a "jobless growth" scenario, squandering its dividend.
China’s Cautionary Tale
China offers a stark comparison. Its TFR fell from 6.4 in 1950 to 1.09 in 2022, driven by the one-child policy (1979-2015). China’s working-age population peaked in 2010 at 70%, fueling decades of double-digit growth post-1994. But its dividend ended abruptly. By 2022, China’s population began declining, dropping from 1.425 billion to a projected 1.31 billion by 2050. Today, its median age is 37.4 (versus India’s 28), and by 2050, it will hit 50.7, with a shrinking workforce supporting a ballooning elderly population.
China’s rapid aging—faster than almost any nation—stems from a TFR well below replacement and limited immigration. Its GDP per capita ($21,000) is higher than India’s ($2,400), but its demographic crisis threatens economic stability. India, with a later dividend window and a less drastic TFR decline, has more time to act—but not much. China’s failure to adapt early—relying on pronatalist policies that yielded little—warns India against complacency.
Dividend or Disaster? The Deciding Factors
India’s demographic future hinges on three pillars:
Education and Skills: Only 47% of women and 53% of men aged 20-24 have completed higher secondary education (NFHS-5). The Gross Enrolment Ratio in higher education is 28.4%, far below developed nations. Without upskilling, India’s youth bulge will be unemployable.
Job Creation: The government’s target of 7.85 million jobs annually is ambitious but achievable with investment in manufacturing, services, and technology. Migration from high-fertility northern states to low-fertility southern ones, as seen in Delhi, could extend the dividend if managed well.
Aging Preparedness: A TFR of 1.29 by 2050 will shrink the workforce while expanding the elderly cohort. India must emulate Japan’s focus on "active aging"—extending working years and enhancing healthcare—rather than China’s reactive approach.
Conclusion
India’s TFR of 2.0, now below the replacement level of 2.1, signals a turning point. The next three decades offer a chance to harness a demographic dividend, but the window is narrowing. Success requires bold policies—massive job creation, education reform, and gender inclusion—lest India follow China into a demographic disaster of aging and economic stagnation. The data is clear: India’s population will peak and decline, but whether this shift fuels prosperity or peril depends on the choices made today.