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Monday, June 16, 2025

Inside the BJP-RSS Digital Machinery: How India’s Most Powerful Political Network Shapes Online Narratives

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), have built one of the most sophisticated political “digital armies” in the world. What began in the mid‑2000s as a handful of social media volunteers has grown into a massive, multi‑layered ecosystem encompassing in‑house teams, marquee ad agencies, boutique specialists and grassroots “shakha” networks — all coordinated to shape narratives, amplify messaging and mobilize voters across India’s 1.4 billion population.

BJP IT Cell: The In‑House Engine
Founded in 2007, the BJP IT Cell was the first Indian party unit to treat social media as a core campaigning arm. By 2014, it had formalized operations under then‑convenor Arvind Gupta and head Amit Malviya, building a manpower pipeline that today claims over 5,000 core workers at state and district levels, supported by some 150,000 social‑media operatives spreading targeted posts across WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. Wikipedia, Wired .In routine election cycles, these teams deploy data analytics and micro‑targeted messaging — often via proprietary apps like SARAL — to reach up to 100,000 voters per day with campaign updates, policy pitches and get‑out‑the‑vote reminders Source.

While the IT Cell handles grassroots mobilization, the BJP also contracts top industry players for broad‑reach campaigns:

Madison Media: Retained since 2014 for nationwide media planning and buying across print, TV and radio Source1, Source2
McCann Worldgroup–TAG & Scarecrow M&C Saatchi: Awarded creative and digital mandates ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, overseeing everything from influencer tie‑ups to outdoor hoardings Source1, Source2.
SEO Corporation, Ogilvy & Mather, Soho Square: Handled early digital advertising, social‑media blogging and localized outreach in 2014, with senior BJP leaders personally acknowledging their contributions Source1, Source2.

Boutique Specialists & Grassroots Tools
Beyond the big names, the BJP’s digital playbook employs:

Meme‑Marketing Agencies (e.g., Acquaint Consultants): Tasked with crafting viral memes around trending topics — spending on Google ads alone topped ₹5.37 crore in a recent 30‑day window, with Meta ad spends of ₹1.31 crore Source
VivaConnect’s “LiveTalk”: A voice‑broadcast service used in 2014 to stream Narendra Modi’s speeches into “media‑dark” rural households via regular phone calls; it reached over a million callers for the Prime Minister’s oath‑taking ceremony en.wikipedia.org.
Secret “War Rooms”: Data teams like those set up by Sapiens Research to mobilize 12.5 million female voters in 2024 — leveraging call centers, WhatsApp and village‑level self‑help groups to track and engage constituents door‑to‑door wired.com.

RSS Digital Infrastructure & Volunteer Mobilization
Parallel to the BJP’s IT Cell, the RSS is revamping its own digital training and outreach:

Digital “Shakhas”: In late 2023, RSS organised “digital shakha” workshops for 150 influencers, equipping them with IT Cell‑style messaging playbooks to amplify pro‑Modi content across social platforms thetimes.co.uk.
Shakha App: Since 2020, roughly 1.5 lakh volunteers in the Kashi Prant have adopted a nine‑module “Shakha” mobile app — covering everything from daily drills to offline event coordination — to stay connected and “take up organisational activities” online timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
Volunteer Scale: The RSS reports over 37 lakh regular shakha attendances nationwide, with an additional 7.25 lakh join‑requests via its “Join RSS” portal between 2017–2022 — underscoring the Sangh’s digital embrace to bolster traditional ground‑game methods Source .

By integrating high‑tech campaign analytics, marquee agency firepower and deep volunteer networks — both BJP’s IT Cell and the RSS have effectively rewritten India’s playbook for voter outreach. As digital platforms evolve, these structures are likely to become even more granular, personalized and automated — raising both strategic possibilities and urgent questions about transparency, data privacy and the shaping of democratic discourse.

Sunday, May 25, 2025

The Caste-Based Reservation Debate: A Misunderstood Reality

In India, few topics ignite as much public passion as caste-based reservation. For some, it is a necessary corrective to centuries of discrimination. For others, it’s perceived as an unfair advantage. But what if much of the public debate is centered on a numerical illusion?

Contrary to widespread belief, caste-based reservation accounts for less than 2% of all jobs in India. This isn’t an opinion — it’s a hard number based on publicly available data.

Breaking Down the Numbers

Let’s start with the facts:

Total workforce in India (FY 2023–24): ~643 million people.
[Source: Reserve Bank of India, CMIE]
Public-sector employment: Only about 3.8% of India’s jobs are in the public sector (including central/state government, PSUs, etc.).
→ 643 million × 3.8% = ~24.4 million public-sector jobs
Reservation coverage:
Under central rules, 49.5% of government jobs are reserved:
SC (15%)
ST (7.5%)
OBC (27%)
→ 49.5% of 24.4 million = ~12.1 million reserved jobs
Total reservation share in all jobs:
12.1 million ÷ 643 million = ~1.9%

Yes, that’s it. Just 1.9% of all jobs in India are covered by caste-based reservation policies.

What About the Private Sector?

This number is so low because over 90% of India’s jobs are in the private and informal sectors, where caste-based reservation does not apply.

Despite calls from various political parties and social justice activists, no pan-India law mandates reservation in private companies. A few states like Maharashtra have experimented with it, but enforcement is patchy, and many such laws are stuck in legal limbo.

Why This Is So Worrying

Policy vs. Perception Disconnect
Walk into any WhatsApp group, college debate, or comment section, and you’ll hear that “reservation is everywhere” or that “merit is being destroyed.” But this data proves otherwise. The entire narrative rests on just 1.9% of all jobs.
Misplaced Anger
Many upper-caste youth who struggle in competitive exams often channel frustration toward caste-based quotas, even though most of their job prospects lie in the unreserved private sector. The real bottleneck isn’t reservation — it’s a broken job market, low economic growth, and lack of opportunities.
Blind Spot in Social Justice
On the other side, those who believe that reservation has “uplifted” entire communities must also acknowledge that its reach is extremely limited. The vast majority of Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs are still stuck in informal jobs with no protections — let alone reservations.
Myth of Overrepresentation
There’s a recurring narrative that reserved groups are now overrepresented in bureaucracy or government. But data shows that SCs, STs, and OBCs are still underrepresented in higher government posts, courts, academia, and corporate leadership.

Why It Matters

We are debating less than 2% of the job pie while ignoring the 98% that’s unregulated, exclusionary, and caste-stratified in more subtle ways.

This massive disconnect leads to:

Divisive politics that weaponize identity.
Young people blaming the wrong system for their unemployment.
Neglect of real affirmative action reforms for the private sector.
Little to no pressure to create better universal job policy.

The Way Forward

We need to realign the conversation:

Acknowledge the data: Understand where reservation applies — and where it doesn’t.
Demand broader equity: Instead of fighting over the 1.9%, demand transparency, diversity, and opportunity in the remaining 98%.
Reframe the narrative: Stop treating reservation as a dominant force. Start recognizing it as a narrow tool trying to correct a vast historical imbalance.

Conclusion

The idea that caste-based reservation dominates India’s job market is a myth — and a dangerous one at that. By obsessing over a policy that affects just a sliver of the workforce, we ignore the real structural crises: job scarcity, inequality, and private-sector exclusion.

If we want a fairer India, we must move beyond rhetoric — and start looking at the numbers. Because right now, the perception is wildly out of sync with reality.

The Selective Lens of Hindu Nationalism: Ignoring Dalit Oppression in Historical Narratives

Hindu nationalism in India often constructs its identity around a selective reading of history, emphasizing perceived injustices inflicted by Muslim rulers while sidelining the deep-rooted and millennia-long oppression of Dalits within Hindu society. This selective historical narrative serves a political purpose but distorts the broader reality of India’s social history, particularly the systemic discrimination faced by Dalits under caste hierarchies that predate and outlast any external rule. By focusing almost exclusively on Hindu-Muslim conflicts, Hindu nationalists conveniently evade accountability for the internal structural violence perpetuated by upper-caste Hindus against Dalits, a practice that has persisted for over two millennia.

The Hindu Nationalist Historical Narrative

Hindu nationalism, as propagated by organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its affiliates, often portrays Indian history as a saga of Hindu victimhood under Muslim rule, particularly during the Mughal era. This narrative highlights events like temple destructions or forced conversions, framing Muslims as perpetual aggressors against a monolithic Hindu identity. While historical instances of conflict between Hindu and Muslim rulers are undeniable, this framing deliberately oversimplifies India’s complex past, ignoring the diversity of Hindu society and its internal hierarchies.

What is conspicuously absent from this narrative is any acknowledgment of the caste system’s role in oppressing millions of Dalits, who were relegated to the margins of society long before the arrival of Muslim rulers. By fixating on external “invaders,” Hindu nationalists deflect attention from the internal systemic injustices that have defined Hindu social order for centuries.

The Millennia-Long Oppression of Dalits

The caste system, deeply embedded in Hindu social and religious practices, has systematically marginalized Dalits (formerly referred to as “untouchables”) for over two thousand years. Ancient texts like the Manusmriti codified discriminatory practices, prescribing harsh punishments for lower castes who dared to transgress their assigned roles. Dalits were deemed impure, their touch or even shadow considered polluting by upper-caste Hindus. These beliefs were not isolated but institutionalized, shaping social interactions, economic opportunities, and religious access.

Historical accounts, such as those by the Chinese traveler Faxian (Fa-Hsien) during the Gupta period (4th–6th century CE), describe the plight of the Chandalas, a lower-caste group forced to live outside villages and announce their presence to avoid “polluting” others. This is not a relic of the distant past; discriminatory practices persisted into the modern era. Dalits were barred from temples, forbidden from drawing water from village wells, and subjected to humiliating customs like the “breast tax” in parts of South India, where lower-caste women were forced to pay to cover their bodies. These practices were not imposed by Muslim rulers but were enforced by upper-caste Hindus, who held social and religious authority.

Even today, the legacy of caste oppression endures. Manual scavenging, a dehumanizing practice where individuals (overwhelmingly Dalits) clean human waste from dry latrines, remains a stark reminder of caste-based exploitation. Despite legal bans, reports estimate that over 1.3 million Dalits are still engaged in this work, facing social stigma and health risks. Hindu nationalist discourse rarely addresses these modern injustices, focusing instead on historical grievances against Muslims or contemporary issues like “love jihad.”

Why Hindu Nationalists Avoid the Dalit Question

The reluctance of Hindu nationalists to confront caste oppression stems from both ideological and strategic considerations. Ideologically, their vision of a unified Hindu identity requires downplaying internal divisions like caste, which fracture the notion of a cohesive “Hindu nation.” Acknowledging the historical and ongoing oppression of Dalits would force a reckoning with the role of upper-caste Hindus in perpetuating this system, undermining the narrative of Hindu victimhood.

Strategically, Hindu nationalism relies on mobilizing a broad Hindu voter base, including Dalits, to counter perceived threats from minorities. Admitting the historical guilt of upper-caste oppression risks alienating Dalit communities, who have increasingly asserted their rights through movements inspired by leaders like Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Instead, Hindu nationalist rhetoric often co-opts Dalit identity, portraying them as part of the Hindu fold while ignoring their specific grievances. This tokenism is evident in the selective celebration of Ambedkar as a Hindu icon, while his critiques of caste and Hinduism are conveniently ignored.

The Consequences of Selective History

This selective reading of history has profound implications. By focusing on Muslim oppression while ignoring caste-based atrocities, Hindu nationalists perpetuate a distorted understanding of India’s past that fuels communal tensions. This narrative not only marginalizes Dalits but also erases the contributions of lower-caste reformers who fought against caste oppression, from Jyotirao Phule to Periyar.

Moreover, it distracts from addressing contemporary issues like manual scavenging, caste-based violence, and discrimination in education and employment. According to a 2020 report by the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, over 40% of Dalit households in rural India still face untouchability practices, such as being denied access to public spaces or services. These are not relics of a distant past but ongoing realities that Hindu nationalist discourse sidesteps.

Toward a More Honest Historical Reckoning

A balanced understanding of Indian history requires acknowledging both external conflicts and internal injustices. The oppression of Dalits is not a peripheral issue but a central feature of India’s social history, one that predates and outlasts Muslim rule. Hindu nationalists must confront the uncomfortable truth that upper-caste Hindus were complicit in a system that dehumanized millions for millennia. Only by addressing this can India move toward a more inclusive national identity that honors all its citizens.

This is not to diminish the complexities of Hindu-Muslim relations or the historical realities of invasions and conquests. But a singular focus on one form of oppression while ignoring another is not just selective — it’s dishonest. True nationalism should uplift the marginalized, not erase their suffering. Until Hindu nationalists engage with the full spectrum of India’s history, including the painful legacy of caste, their vision of a unified nation will remain incomplete.

Friday, May 9, 2025

Measuring Diversity: A Quantitative Comparison Between India and the United States

What Is Diversity?

Diversity refers to the presence of differences within a given setting, encompassing variations in race, ethnicity, language, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and more. It plays a central role in shaping societies, influencing everything from cultural richness to policy frameworks. However, while the concept of diversity is often used qualitatively, it can also be rigorously quantified using statistical tools.

How Can Diversity Be Quantitatively Measured?

Quantifying diversity allows for objective comparison across regions, populations, or time. In the context of categorical data (e.g., religions, languages, ethnic groups), three commonly used metrics are:

Simpson’s Diversity Index (D): Also known as the fractionalization index, it measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups, D = 1 — ∑ pᵢ² where pᵢ is the proportion of group
Shannon-Weiner Index (H): A measure derived from information theory, it reflects the uncertainty or entropy in the dataset, H = — ∑ pᵢ ln(pᵢ)
Pielou’s Evenness Index (J): This indicates how evenly the individuals are distributed across different groups, J = H / ln(S)

Case Study 1: Religious Diversity

India (2011 Census)

Hindu: 79.8%
Muslim: 14.2%
Christian: 2.3%
Sikh: 1.7%
Buddhist: 0.7%
Jain: 0.4%
Others/None: 0.9%

Calculated metrics:

D = 0.3421
H = 0.7130
J = 0.3665

D=0.3421 means there’s about a 34.2% chance that two randomly selected individuals belong to different religions.

H=0.7130 quantifies the “information content” (higher → more diversity).

J=0.3665 (on a 0–1 scale) shows that the observed distribution is only about 36.7% as even as it would be if all seven groups were equally large.

United States (Pew 2014)

Christian: 70.6%
Unaffiliated: 22.8%
Jewish: 1.9%
Muslim: 0.9%
Buddhist: 0.7%
Hindu: 0.7%
Other/Unknown: 2.4%

Calculated metrics:

D = 0.4485
H = 0.8595
J = 0.4417

Conclusion:

— Higher D in the U.S. means there’s a greater probability (~44.9%) that two randomly selected Americans belong to different religious categories, versus ~34.2% in India.
— Higher H and J likewise indicate the U.S. has both a richer mix of groups and a more even spread across them.

In sum, by these common indices, the U.S. is measurably more religiously diverse than India (as of the most recent comparable data).

Case Study 2: Linguistic Diversity

India (2011 Census — 22 Scheduled Languages)

Proportions range from Hindi (43.63%) to Sanskrit (0.002%), including Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, etc.

Calculated metrics:

D = 0.7690
H = 2.0730
J = 0.6710

— We used the 2011 first‐language shares for the 22 schedule languages (e.g. Hindi 43.63%, Bengali 8.30%, …, Sanskrit 0.002%) and normalized them to sum to 1.
— The high D (≈ 0.77) and H (≈ 2.07) reflect both the large number of language groups and that none besides Hindi completely dominates.
— Evenness J≈0.67 shows the actual distribution is about 67% as even as it would be if all 22 languages were equally spoken.

United States (ACS 2011–5 Language Groups)

English only: 78.5%
Spanish: 13.4%
Other Indo-European: 4.7%
Asian & Pacific Islander: 3.6%
Other: 1.8%

Calculated metrics:

D = 0.3880
H = 0.7990
J = 0.4970

— We grouped home‐language use into five categories: “English only” 78.5%, “Spanish” 13.4%, “Other Indo-European” 4.7%, “Asian & Pacific Islander” 3.6%, and “All other languages” 1.8%, then normalized to sum 1
— Lower D (≈ 0.39) and H (≈ 0.80) are driven by the very large English share.
— Evenness J≈0.50 reflects that English heavily outweighs the other four groups.

India’s linguistic landscape is far more diverse and evenly distributed than that of the U.S.

Final Summary

Conclusion

Quantitative analysis reveals that while India exhibits extremely high linguistic diversity, the United States is more diverse in terms of religion and ethnicity. These metrics provide a robust foundation for comparative sociocultural studies and policy design in multicultural contexts.

References

Religious Composition Data

India

Source: Census of India 2011, Religion Data
Link: https://censusindia.gov.in

United States

Source: Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study (2014)
Link: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/

Language Composition Data

India

Source: Census of India 2011, Language Data — 22 Scheduled Languages
Link: https://censusindia.gov.in/2011Census/C-16.html

United States

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (ACS) 2011 — Language Spoken at Home
Link: https://data.census.gov

Tuesday, May 6, 2025

Why India’s Below-Replacement Fertility Rate Is Not a Cause for Alarm

India’s total fertility rate (TFR) dipping below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman has sparked debates, with some voices urging Indians to have more children to counter perceived demographic decline. However, this concern is overstated and often ignores the broader context of India’s socioeconomic realities and global examples like Japan. A falling TFR is not a harbinger of doom but often a sign of progress, reflecting improvements in education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. Here’s why India’s declining fertility rate should be viewed with nuance rather than panic.

Japan’s Example: Low TFR, Thriving Economy

Consider Japan, a nation often cited in discussions about low fertility. In 1960, Japan’s TFR was around 2.00, and it has since declined to 1.26 in 2023. Does this mean the Japanese have gone extinct in 2025? Far from it. Japan remains a global economic powerhouse, with a highly advanced economy, cutting-edge technology, and a robust social system. While Japan faces challenges like an aging population and labor shortages, its low TFR has not erased its achievements or societal stability. Instead, Japan has adapted through automation, immigration policies, and productivity gains. India, with its unique context, can learn from such examples rather than fear a similar trajectory.

India’s Context: Population and Resource Constraints

India is the world’s most populous country, with over 1.4 billion people. The notion that a TFR below 2.1 threatens the nation’s future overlooks the strain already placed on its resources. For instance, India’s judiciary is burdened with over 50 million pending cases, reflecting systemic inefficiencies exacerbated by population pressure. Additionally, around 800 million people rely on subsidized food rations for survival, underscoring the challenges of poverty and food security. More children in this context would likely intensify these issues, not resolve them.

The argument that India needs more people to sustain economic growth or demographic dividends ignores the quality-over-quantity principle. A smaller, healthier, better-educated population is far more productive than a larger one struggling with inadequate infrastructure, education, and healthcare. India’s socioeconomic problems—unemployment, urban overcrowding, environmental degradation—cannot be solved by increasing birth rates. Instead, they require investments in education, skill development, and equitable resource distribution.

Falling Fertility Reflects Progress

A declining TFR often signals positive societal changes. In India, states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra have had below-replacement TFRs for decades, yet they consistently rank among the country’s most developed regions. These states boast higher female literacy, greater workforce participation, lower child mortality, and better access to family planning. These are not signs of decline but of empowerment and progress.

Higher Female Education: Educated women tend to have fewer children, prioritizing quality of life for themselves and their families. In Kerala, female literacy is near 100%, correlating with a TFR of around 1.6.
More Workforce Participation: As women enter the workforce, they delay marriage and childbirth, contributing to economic growth. Tamil Nadu’s industrial and service sectors thrive partly due to higher female employment.
Lower Child Mortality: Improved healthcare means families no longer need to have multiple children to ensure survival. India’s infant mortality rate has dropped significantly, from 66 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to under 30 in 2023.
Family Planning Access: Access to contraception and reproductive health services empowers couples to make informed choices, aligning family size with economic realities.

These factors reflect a society transitioning toward stability and prosperity, not one on the brink of collapse.

The Real Challenges Lie Elsewhere

Rather than fixating on TFR, India should address more pressing issues. The country’s demographic dividend—its large working-age population—will only yield benefits if accompanied by quality education, job creation, and healthcare access. An overemphasis on increasing birth rates distracts from these priorities. Moreover, an aging population, often cited as a concern, is a future challenge that can be managed through policies like Japan’s, including pension reforms, eldercare systems, and selective immigration.

A Call for Reflection

Those advocating for higher birth rates in India should pause and reflect on what they’re truly proposing. In a nation grappling with overpopulation, resource scarcity, and systemic inefficiencies, encouraging more births risks exacerbating existing problems. The success of states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu shows that lower fertility can coexist with prosperity. Japan’s experience demonstrates that a low TFR does not spell extinction but adaptation.

India’s focus should be on building a sustainable future for its existing population—through education, employment, and equitable growth—rather than worrying about a fertility rate that reflects progress. A smaller, more empowered population is not a threat but an opportunity to create a stronger, more resilient India.

Sunday, April 27, 2025

Why ANI ancestry dominates Bollywood

Bollywood’s obsession with lighter skin and sharp features didn’t start with colonialism — the roots run far deeper, into India’s ancient history.

Even today, Indian cinema (including Tollywood) reflects these old preferences. Here’s how it happened — with examples.

1. Bollywood Evolved in North India

Bollywood began in Mumbai (then Bombay), a city historically tied to northern India through migration from Punjab, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan.
Northern and northwestern Indians generally carry more ANI (Ancestral North Indian) ancestry — genetically linked to Central Asian, Persian, and early Indo-European groups.

Thus, the early faces of Bollywood — from Raj Kapoor to Dev Anand — often showcased lighter skin, straighter noses, and taller frames, typical of ANI-heavy populations.

Even today, many leading actors like Hrithik Roshan and Kareena Kapoor Khan come from families rooted in North India, carrying forward that visual template.

2. Beauty Standards: Pre-Colonial, Mughal, and Colonial Influence

The preference for fair skin in India long predates British colonialism.

Ancient Hindu texts such as the Manusmriti and Puranic stories often describe gods and ideal humans as having radiant, golden, or fair complexions.
For instance, Lord Krishna — whose name literally means “dark” — is sometimes visually depicted in later eras with lighter or bluish skin to soften his “darkness” in art and literature.

During Mughal rule, this bias deepened. Mughal miniatures often portrayed nobility with pale skin tones, drawing from Persian aesthetics where light skin symbolized elite status.
Look at historical love stories like Anarkali and Salim — Anarkali was mythologized as a breathtakingly fair woman.

By the time the British arrived, India already equated fairness with wealth, refinement, and desirability. Colonial rule only codified this hierarchy — legally and socially.

Bollywood, reflecting society, continued the trend.
Fair-skinned stars like Madhubala, Meena Kumari, Sadhana, and later Aishwarya Rai became iconic for their ethereal, light-skinned beauty.

3. Class and Access to Opportunities

Higher social groups historically had greater ANI ancestry — and by extension, better access to wealth, education, and opportunity.
Cinema, being expensive to enter and risky in early decades, became dominated by elites.

For example, Prithviraj Kapoor, the patriarch of Bollywood’s Kapoor dynasty, hailed from a literate, influential Punjabi family.
Similarly, Dilip Kumar (born Muhammad Yusuf Khan) came from a well-to-do Pathan family.

Their urban, connected backgrounds — along with their socially “approved” appearance — helped them thrive in the nascent industry.

4. Urban Migration Patterns

Migration patterns to Mumbai and other cities played a huge role too.

Most early Bollywood stars — such as Ashok Kumar, Dev Anand, Rajendra Kumar, and Sunil Dutt — were products of urban migration waves dominated by relatively well-off northern families.

Wealthier northern families had the means to send children to arts colleges, drama schools, or simply to support a struggling acting career — luxuries that most rural Indians couldn’t afford.

5. Tollywood’s Parallel Bias

Interestingly, even in Tollywood (Telugu cinema), where male heroes like Chiranjeevi, Prabhas, or Allu Arjun often sport darker, more Dravidian features proudly, the female leads often tell a different story.

Heroines are frequently imported from North India:
Kajal Aggarwal (Mumbai, Punjabi family), Tamannaah Bhatia (Mumbai, Sindhi family), Hansika Motwani (Mumbai, Sindhi family), and Rakul Preet Singh (Delhi, Punjabi family) — all fair-skinned, north-origin actresses dominating Telugu screens.

Even Pooja Hegde — although born in Karnataka — fits the pan-Indian fair-skin aesthetic preferred for female leads.

Thus, the “fairness fixation” isn’t just a Bollywood quirk — it’s a pan-Indian phenomenon, affecting casting choices even in southern industries that otherwise celebrate darker-skinned male heroes.

In Short:

Historical north Indian dominance +
Pre-colonial, Mughal, and colonial beauty standards +
Class-based access to elite opportunities =
A film industry where ANI-featured faces became (and still often remain) the default.

But Times Are Changing

Modern Indian cinema is gradually shifting.

Actors like Nawazuddin Siddiqui, Vijay Sethupathi, Dhanush, and actresses like Sai Pallavi are breaking traditional beauty norms, gaining immense popularity despite not fitting the old “fair-skinned” ideal.

OTT platforms have further democratized opportunities — allowing talent from every part of India, regardless of skin tone or facial features, to shine.

The change is slow — but it’s happening.
Indian cinema, like Indian society, is beginning to confront and question its oldest biases.

If you enjoyed this article, follow me for more pieces decoding Indian culture, history, and society.

Wednesday, April 23, 2025

India’s ₹598 Crore Gamble on Cow Urine and Dung Research: A Wasteful Pursuit?

In recent years, the Government of India has poured significant resources into researching and commercializing cow urine and dung, driven by a blend of cultural reverence and economic ambition. Official figures indicate at least ₹598 crore has been allocated to these efforts, with programs like the Rashtriya Kamdhenu Aayog and SUTRA-PIC leading the charge. While proponents argue these initiatives preserve traditional knowledge and boost rural economies, critics — including myself — see this as a colossal waste of public funds on scientifically dubious pursuits. Let’s unpack the numbers, the science, and why this investment feels like a misstep.

The Scale of Spending

The financial commitment to cow urine and dung research is staggering. According to available data, the government has allocated funds through several high-profile initiatives:

Rashtriya Kamdhenu Aayog: Launched with a ₹500 crore corpus in the 2019–20 Union Budget, this program supports startups and research focused on cow products, including urine and dung. As reported by the Times of India, the initiative aims to fund cow-based startups with up to 60% government backing, encouraging ventures that commercialize these products for medicinal and agricultural use (Times of India, 2019: Cow-based startups to get 60% government funding).
SUTRA-PIC Research Scheme: This inter-ministerial program, allocated ₹98 crore, focuses on scientific research into indigenous cow products. The Hindu noted its launch in 2020, emphasizing validation of health and agricultural benefits, though budgetary details remain murky (The Hindu, 2020: Government unveils plan for research on ‘indigenous’ cows).
SVAROP Program: Initiated in 2017, this effort to validate Panchgavya (cow dung, urine, milk, curd, ghee) has seen at least ₹30 crore sanctioned, with the Hindu reporting that only a fraction of the proposed ₹100 crore was disbursed due to funding delays (The Hindu, 2019: Lack of funds from Centre stalls research in cow-derivatives).

Beyond these, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Ministry of AYUSH conduct ongoing research, with undisclosed budgets adding uncertainty to the total. The Indian Express highlighted CSIR’s work, including US patents for cow urine’s bio-enhancing properties, while AYUSH explores anti-cancer claims (Indian Express, 2015: CSIR team testing cow urine for medical benefits, govt tells LS; Hindustan Times, 2017: Govt labs researching cow urine for anti-cancer trait: Ministry of Ayush).

Cumulatively, these efforts account for at least ₹628 crore, though some estimates peg the figure at ₹598 crore, possibly excluding smaller programs like SVAROP. Either way, the scale is undeniable — and, in my view, indefensible.

The Scientific Controversy

The rationale for this spending often hinges on Ayurveda and cultural tradition, with claims that cow urine and dung treat ailments from diabetes to cancer. Yet, the scientific community remains deeply skeptical. Over 100 scientists criticized SUTRA-PIC as “unscientific,” urging its withdrawal, as reported by the Indian Express (Indian Express, 2020: Research plan on ‘indigenous’ cows: Scientists urge govt to withdraw programme, call it unscientific). They argued that funding such research diverts resources from more pressing scientific priorities.

While CSIR’s patents suggest some bioactivity, peer-reviewed studies validating medicinal claims are scarce. Most evidence remains anecdotal or preliminary, failing to meet rigorous standards. Spending hundreds of crores on unproven hypotheses feels reckless when India faces urgent challenges like healthcare access and climate resilience, where funds could yield tangible results.

A Misguided Economic Bet

Proponents argue that cow-based startups could boost rural economies, creating jobs and sustainable products. The Rashtriya Kamdhenu Aayog’s ₹500 crore infusion aims to make this a reality, with Pakwired noting the push for youth-led cow-product ventures (Pakwired, 2019: INDIA: 60% funding for cow dung, urine startups). But the market for cow urine and dung — whether as medicines, fertilizers, or cosmetics — is niche and unproven at scale. Betting public funds on speculative industries, especially without robust scientific backing, risks economic failure and squandered resources.

Contrast this with investments in renewable energy or digital infrastructure, which have clearer paths to economic impact. The government’s enthusiasm for cow products seems driven more by cultural ideology than sound economics, a priorities that feels out of step with India’s modern ambitions.

Why It’s a Waste

In my opinion, this ₹598 crore (or more) allocation is a textbook case of misdirected priorities. India’s scientific and economic challenges demand investments in areas with proven potential — be it vaccine development, clean energy, or education. Pouring funds into cow urine and dung research, where scientific consensus is shaky and commercial viability uncertain, is not just wasteful but a disservice to taxpayers. The cultural argument, while emotionally compelling, doesn’t justify diverting resources from pressing needs.

The government could redirect these funds to bolster healthcare infrastructure, fund cutting-edge biotech, or support sustainable agriculture with proven methods. Instead, we’re chasing unverified claims, risking both credibility and capital.

Conclusion

India’s ₹598 crore investment in cow urine and dung research reflects a complex interplay of culture, science, and economics — but it’s a gamble that doesn’t pay off. As the Indian Express scientists warned, such programs risk undermining India’s scientific rigor. With limited resources, the government must prioritize impact over ideology. It’s time to rethink this costly pursuit and focus on challenges that truly shape India’s future.